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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 328 Barry Avenue v. Nolan Properties Group, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations under section
1
541.051, applying to claims of defective construction of an
improvement to real property, does not require that construction
2
be substantially complete before such claims accrue. The court
further held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
when the owner discovered the actionable injury sufficient to
trigger the statute of limitations, so it reversed and remanded the
3
district court’s grant of summary judgment on that issue. The
court’s decision regarding the statute of limitations question
accurately reflected legislative intent to protect construction
4
companies from liability for stale claims. However, the court
should have taken a firm stance favoring a more lenient “discovery
of injury” standard to protect owners from losing claims to the
strict statute of limitations period. This approach would result in an
increase in judicial efficiency and would ensure the most cost- and
resource-efficient path to recourse for both parties.
This Note first gives an overview of the historical purpose of
statutes of limitations and traces the modern trend of applying the
5
discovery rule in construction litigation. It then reviews the
6
discovery rule’s adoption and rejection in Minnesota common law.
1. MINN. STAT. § 541.051(1)(a) (2015) (“[N]o action by any person . . . for
any injury to property . . . arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an
improvement to real property, shall be brought . . . more than two years after
discovery of the injury . . . .”).
2. 871 N.W.2d 745, 751 (Minn. 2016).
3. Id. at 753.
4. See id. at 750.
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part II.
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This Note then discusses both parties’ arguments and the rationale
7
of the 328 Barry decision. After evaluating the relevant law and the
rationale of this decision, this Note endorses the court’s narrow
8
interpretation of the statute of limitations; but, it also discusses the
implications of the court’s failure to clarify the “discovery of injury”
9
standard. This Note agrees that the Minnesota Supreme Court
made the correct decision that the statute of limitations on
construction-defect claims may begin before substantial
10
completion. This Note concludes, however, that the court missed
an opportunity to adopt a bright-line discovery of injury rule that
would be reflective of public policy and facilitate future
11
adjudication of complex construction-related litigation.
II. HISTORY OF THE RELEVANT LAW
A.

History of Statutes of Limitations in Construction-Defect Claims

Although the construction industry has experienced periods of
stagnation, such as during the Great Recession, the construction
12
industry remains a big industry in the United States. The benefits
of new construction to both construction companies and owners
are significant: good business with high profits and long-term
ownership of an increasingly valuable property. However,
construction also poses equally significant risks to both parties.
Constantly changing legislation over the past forty years has sought
to balance and protect the parties’ conflicting interests. For years,
courts have tried to protect owners’ legitimate claims while also
shielding construction companies from unforeseeable and endless
13
liability. To do so, courts have had to balance construction
companies’ ability to insure and defend themselves from claims
against owners’ interests in living and working in safe and defect-

7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Section IV.A.
9. See infra Sections IV.B, IV.C.
10. See infra Part V.
11. See infra Part V.
12. See Tim Henderson, U.S. Construction Is on the Rebound After the Great
Recession, PBS NEWSHOUR: THE RUNDOWN (Aug. 30, 2016, 9:25 AM), http://
www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/u-s-construction-rebound-great-recession.
13. See generally Paul D. Rheingold, Solving Statutes of Limitation Problems, 4 AM.
JUR. TRIALS 441 (1996).
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free property. Instead of requiring courts to singlehandedly
determine the validity of a claim, states have passed statutes of
limitations and statutes of repose in attempts to establish
15
consistency and objectively settle expectations.
Many statutes of limitations on claims arising from
improvements to real property were enacted between the 1960s
and 1980s as a response to pressure from construction
professionals over concerns that never-ending exposure to liability
was becoming too costly to insure against and that claims were too
16
difficult to defend. Specifically, this movement can be traced to
the gradual shift away from the privity-of-contract requirement in
17
construction-defect claims. The privity requirement shielded
18
construction and design professionals from third-party claims.
The gradual rejection of this doctrine from the early- to mid-1900s
was the result of a distinct shift in attitude towards favoring
19
consumer remedies. Although construction companies were
thought to be more capable of absorbing liability than individual
consumers, their increased vulnerability to unexpected claims
drove up insurance costs and drove some companies out of
20
business.
State legislatures passed statutes of limitations for constructiondefect claims to address these issues in hopes of revitalizing the
21
construction industry and supporting public policy objectives.
14.

See 2 PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER & O’CONNOR
§ 7:174.50, Westlaw (database updated June 2016).
15. Id.
16. See id.; see also Katherine L. Johansen, Property: Adventures in Boondoggle?
The Unnecessary (and Inaccurate) Legislative Intent Analysis of Lietz v. Northern States
Power Co., 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1555, 1559 (2008) (discussing public policy
arguments that capping liability would protect builders from timeless claims, lower
building costs, and improve the construction market).
17. See Michael J. Vardaro & Jennifer E. Waggoner, Statutes of Repose—the
Design Professional’s Defense to Perpetual Liability, 10 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT.
697, 701 (1995).
18. Id. Vardaro and Waggoner trace the first attack on the privity doctrine to
a 1916 products liability case that held that privity was not required where a
manufacturer’s negligence resulted in a consumer’s personal injury. Id. at 701
n.39 (citing MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916)).
For a list of cases from the mid-1900s abolishing the privity requirement, see id. at
702, n.40.
19. See id. at 701–02.
20. See id. at 702.
21. See id. at 703.
ON CONSTRUCTION LAW
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Most importantly, these statutes were passed to protect builders
22
against false, fraudulent, and unjustifiably stale claims.
Construction and design professionals faced considerable obstacles
in defending old claims due to “unavailability of witnesses, memory
23
loss and a lack of adequate records.” These statutes lent some
certainty as to when builders’ liability ended and provided enough
predictability to allow builders to safely dispose of old records and
24
pursue new projects.
In addition to statutes of limitations, almost all states have
passed statutes of repose to protect builders and architects from
25
long-term liability exposure. The same policy objectives behind
26
statutes of limitations apply to statutes of repose. Importantly,
statutes of repose cap a construction professional’s liability on a
distinct date, after which they can no longer be held liable for their
27
actions. However, unlike statutes of limitations, statutes of repose
begin on a specific date, which is usually the date of substantial
completion, and nullify both the remedy and the plaintiff’s right of
28
action against the defendant. Statutes of repose have been
controversial since their enactment because they impose a strict
limitation on causes of action, irrespective of the circumstances of
the case, and have been the subject of constitutional challenges in
29
many states. A majority of the due process and equal protection
issues have been addressed, but statutes of repose are still under
22. See id.; see also 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 14, § 7:174.50.
23. Sartori v. Harnischfeger Corp., 432 N.W.2d 448, 454 (Minn. 1988)
(finding that the policy objective behind Minnesota’s statute of limitations on
construction-defect claims was legitimate).
24. See Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of
Limitation, 28 PAC. L.J. 453, 469–70 (1997).
25. See Vardaro & Waggoner, supra note 17, at 714–15.
26. See James Duffy O’Connor, Suppose Repose Were Indisposed: A True Story
Prediction of Collapse and Disaster for the Construction Industry, 34 CONSTR. L. 5, 7–8
(2014) (discussing the policy objectives behind statutes of repose).
27. See id.
28. See id. at 6; see also Vardaro & Waggoner, supra note 17, at 715 (noting
that statutes of repose do not extend statutes of limitation but function solely to
preclude all claims after a specific time period).
29. See JAMES ACRET & ANNETTE DAVIS PERROCHET, CONSTR. LITIG. HANDBOOK
§ 22:4 (3d ed. 2016) (noting that statutes of repose create a special class of citizens
(those listed in the statute) who are not liable for their wrongful acts after a
certain date); 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 14, § 7:174.50. For a list of cases
holding statutes of repose unconstitutional, see Vardaro & Waggoner, supra note
17, at 712 n.112.
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constant revision to comport with state constitutions. Despite the
controversial nature of statutes of repose, state legislatures’
dedication to amending and maintaining them indicates both the
persistence of the underlying policy concerns and the value of the
31
protections these statutes afford construction professionals.
Unlike statutes of repose, statutes of limitations are generally
32
triggered at the time of the injury or discovery of the injury. They
are not meant to allow defendants to escape liability; statutes of
limitations “are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does
not discriminate between the just and the unjust claim, or the
33
avoidable and unavoidable delay.” As statutes of limitations merely
limit the remedy available to a plaintiff and “[do] not extinguish
the underlying obligation,” they have been subject to far fewer
34
constitutional attacks than statutes of repose. However, state
legislatures frequently amend substantive elements in these
statutes, including time periods, definitions, subject parties, and
subject causes of actions, in the interest of fairness and in light of
35
other developments in the law.
B.

Modern Expansion of the Discovery Rule to Construction-Defect Claims

Since the enactment of statutes of limitations, the trigger for
commencing the statutory period has been a source of unfortunate
36
unpredictability. Where legislation is silent on the specific date or
action commencing the accrual of a cause of action, courts have

30. See Vardaro & Waggoner, supra note 17, at 712.
31. Id. at 716–17 (discussing the policy benefits of statutes of repose to
design professionals and the design industry in general).
32. See 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 14, § 7:174.50.
33. O’Connor, supra note 26, at 6 (quoting Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d
405, 411 (8th Cir. 1982)).
34. See 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 14, § 7:174.50 (quoting Ray & Sons
Masonry Contractors, Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 114 S.W.3d 189, 199 (Ark.
2003)); see also id. § 7:174.52 (noting constitutional challenges to both statutes of
repose and statutes of limitation).
35. See Johansen, supra note 16, at Section II.C (discussing several
amendments to Minnesota’s construction-defect statute of limitations, including
clarifying definitions and expanding applicability to certain causes of action). See
generally Matthew T. Boyer, Modern Legislation Creates Ambiguities in Determining
Deadlines for Asserting Residential Construction Defect Claims, 26 CONSTRUCTION LAW.,
Winter 2006, at 28 (analyzing the impact of modern construction-defect statutes
with independent time limits on statutes of limitations time periods).
36. See ACRET & PERROCHET, supra note 29, § 22:5.
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struggled to achieve unanimity in pinpointing a trigger that
37
protects both construction companies’ and owners’ interests.
Courts have identified this trigger as (1) when the wrongful act
38
39
occurred, (2) the project’s completion date, (3) when the
40
damage occurred, or (4) when the owner knew or should have
41
known of the damage. Of these four interpretations, many states
have recently adopted the fourth: when the owner knew or should
have known of the damage, commonly known as the “discovery
rule.”
The discovery rule mandates that statutes of limitations are not
triggered until the plaintiff has discovered, or reasonably should
42
have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action. The rule
initially applied to medical malpractice and gradually expanded to
other torts where the defects were likely to be unnoticed or
43
misunderstood at the time the tort was committed. Many states
37. See id.
38. Id. (“Many . . . states . . . apply the discovery rule.”).
39. See State v. Lundin, 459 N.E.2d 486, 487 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that a
cause of action against a contractor or architect for defective construction accrues
upon the completion of the actual physical work of the construction); see also City
Sch. Dist. of Newburgh v. Hugh Stubbins & Assocs., 650 N.E.2d 399, 401 (N.Y.
1995) (explaining that regardless of the type of claim, all claims arising out of
defective construction accrue on the date of completion “since all liability has its
genesis in the contractual relationship of the parties”). See generally Farash Constr.
Corp. v. Stanndco Developers, Inc., 139 A.D.2d 899 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988);
Brigham Young Univ. v. Paulsen Constr. Co., 744 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1987); Gateway
Commc’ns, Inc. v. John R. Hess, Inc., 541 S.E.2d 595 (W. Va. 2000).
40. Hasemeier v. Metro Sales, Inc., 699 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)
(quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 516.100 (1978)) (“[T]he cause of action shall not be
deemed to accrue when the wrong is done or the technical breach of contract or
duty occurs, but when the damage resulting therefrom is sustained and is capable
of ascertainment . . . .”); see also MBA Commercial Constr., Inc. v. Roy J.
Hannaford Co., 818 P.2d 469, 474 (Okla. 1991) (holding that the cause of action
against an architect for defective design accrued not at the time the negligent acts
occurred or were discovered, but when the injury or damage was certain and not
just speculative).
41. See Mistry Prabhudas Manji Eng’rs Pvt. Ltd. v. Raytheon Eng’rs &
Constructors, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D. Mass. 2002) (holding that plaintiff’s
knowledge of its injury and cause triggered the limitation period, rather than
plaintiff’s discovery of the defendant’s alleged fraud and misrepresentation).
42. Sonja Larsen, Annotation, Modern Status of the Application of “Discovery
Rule” to Postpone Running of Limitations Against Actions Relating to Breach of Building
and Construction Contracts, 33 A.L.R. 5th 1, 21 (1995); see also Leaf v. City of San
Mateo, 163 Cal. Rptr. 711, 716 (Ct. App. 1980).
43. Larsen, supra note 42, at 1.
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have recently adopted the discovery rule in cases involving
defective construction, analogizing “the hidden defect in the house
44
to the hidden nature of the tort in medical malpractice cases.”
While many courts have applied the discovery rule to
45
construction-defect tort claims, some courts have declined to
46
extend the discovery rule to construction contract claims. These
courts reason that owners, unlike patients, have greater control
over the risks they undertake because they have the ability to take a
number of steps to mitigate such risks and should therefore be
subject to a strict statute of limitations for the sake of predictability
47
and settling expectations. They further reason that applying the
discovery rule to contract claims undermines statutes of limitations
and creates apprehension and uncertainty for defendants as to how
48
long they are subject to liability.
44. Id. at 21.
45. See CLL Assocs. v. Arrowhead Pac. Corp., 497 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Wis.
1993) (noting that because tort claimants usually lack control over their risk of
loss, “a consumer is typically unable to judge or investigate the design and
manufacture quality of most products offered for purchase”); see also 2 BRUNER &
O’CONNOR, supra note 14, § 7:174.59 (noting that in the discovery rule is
frequently applied in cases involving latent defects). See generally Larsen, supra note
42.
46. See Steven C. Bennett, Post-Construction Contract Claims: Statutes of
Limitations and the “Discovery Rule,” 29 CONSTRUCTION LITIG. REP., Sept. 2008, at 1
(discussing the policy considerations of rejecting the discovery rule in
construction contract claims); CLL, 497 N.W.2d at 118 (“[In contract law,] unlike
in tort law, the need to protect defendants from stale or fraudulent claims
outweighs any injustice caused by barring rights of action prior to discovery.”).
47. See CLL, 497 N.W.2d at 118 (declining to apply the discovery rule to a
contract claim because, in theory, contract claimants have more control over their
risks of loss through negotiation of the contract, choice of materials, and
inspections). The CLL court also declined to extend the discovery rule to contract
claims due to the lack of availability of liability insurance to protect defendants
from singlehandedly bearing the costs of a stale claim. Id.; cf. Brisbane Lodging,
L.P. v. Webcor Builders, Inc., 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 467, 474 (Ct. App. 2013) (holding
that parties that contract around the state’s delayed discovery rule waive the right
to be afforded its protections during litigation arising out of that contract). The
Brisbane court noted that while California’s public policy encourages application of
the discovery rule, it also respects parties’ rights to freely contract without judicial
intervention. Id. at 475–76. As such, the court held that “sophisticated parties
should be allowed to strike their own bargains and knowingly and voluntarily
contract in a manner in which certain risks are eliminated and, concomitantly,
rights are relinquished” without violating public policy. Id at 475.
48. See, e.g., Samuel Roberts Noble Found., Inc. v. Vick, 840 P.2d 619, 623
(Okla. 1992) (“Were we to allow application of a discovery rule in contract cases,
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Courts adopting the discovery rule have rationalized that the
rule increases judicial efficiency and mitigates the consequences of
strict interpretations of statutes of limitations as bars to legitimate
49
and sympathetic claims. However, courts generally tend to apply
the rule in a limited manner to avoid negating the original purpose
of statutes of limitation. The discovery rule functions to prevent
defendants from escaping accountability for their mistakes at the
expense of owners who may be reasonably ignorant of an injury or
a cause of an injury; it does not operate to permit or encourage
50
owners to assert claims well after their expiry date. The discovery
rule promotes judicial efficiency by encouraging injured parties to
pursue remedies outside of the courtroom, such as repairs or
thorough investigation into the source of the defect, before turning
51
to the costly and time-consuming process of litigation. While some
courts have liberally extended the discovery rule to all causes of
52
action in any professional malpractice suit, a more common trend
has been to apply the discovery rule on a case-by-case basis,
particularly due to the context heavy and fact-specific nature of the
53
rule.
Although the widespread application of the discovery rule
marks a long overdue attempt at national unanimity, in states that
have applied the rule, courts have differed in their determinations
54
of what owners must discover to trigger the limitations period.
the legislatively-adopted public policy expressed by Section 109 of limiting a
builder’s liability after a certain time lapse would be defeated; a builder’s liability
for breach of contract could extend indefinitely.”).
49. See 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 14, § 7:174.50; see also Ehrenhaft v.
Malcolm Price, Inc., 483 A.2d 1192, 1202 (D.C. 1984) (holding that the discovery
rule applied because the protection the discovery rule afforded the plaintiff
outweighed any potential prejudice to the defendant). The Ehrenhaft court
acknowledged the pragmatic necessity of statutes of limitations, but it ultimately
concluded that the “added burden imposed upon a defendant to defend an ‘old’
claim due to application of the discovery rule is not unreasonable.” Id. at 1202. In
response to arguments that the discovery rule contradicts the underlying policy
objectives of statutes of limitations, the court rationalized that “a plaintiff who will
benefit by invocation of the discovery rule will not be one who has ‘sat’ on his
rights to gain legal advantage.” Id. at 1203.
50. See April Enters. v. KTTV, 195 Cal. Rptr. 421, 437–38 (Ct. App. 1983).
51. Ehrenhaft, 483 A.2d at 1203 (observing that the discovery rule promotes
litigation as a “last resort”).
52. See, e.g., Poffenberger v. Risser, 431 A.2d 677, 680 (Md. 1981).
53. See KTTV, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
54. See 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 14, § 7:174.50 (discussing different
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Some courts require owners to have concrete evidence or
information regarding the defect before a cause of action accrues.
Specifically, these courts mandate that owners must discover the
55
cause of the injury or that damages must be ascertained to trigger
56
the statute of limitations. However, other courts require no
evidence beyond the existence of some damage for a cause of
57
action to accrue.
C.

The Statute of Limitations on Construction Defects in Minnesota

Although Minnesota’s first statute of limitations with specific
time limits for construction-defect litigation was not passed until
1965, Minnesota courts have long applied the concept of statutes of
limitations in construction-defect cases as a way to limit stale claims
and have acknowledged the important policy considerations
58
behind such statutes.
jurisdictions’ interpretations and applications of the discovery rule to
construction-related cases).
55. See, e.g., Criswell v. M.J. Brock & Sons, Inc., 681 P.2d 495, 498–99 (Colo.
1984); Williams v. Kaerek Builders, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 313, 316 (Wis. Ct. App.
1997).
56. See, e.g., Bus. Men’s Assurance Co. of Am. v. Graham, 984 S.W.2d 501, 507
(Mo. 1999); Linn Reorganized Sch. Dist. No. 2 of Osage Cty. v. Butler Mfg. Co.,
672 S.W.2d 340, 343 (Mo. 1984).
57. See, e.g., Lumsden v. Design Tech Builders, Inc., 749 A.2d 796, 801 (Md.
2000) (holding that the cause of action accrued when plaintiffs first discovered the
damage and not when the cause of that damage was actually determined); Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of Neb. v. Lueder Constr. Co., 433 N.W.2d 485, 491–92 (Neb.
1988) (holding that the plaintiff’s claim was time-barred because the defective
condition of the building was such that the plaintiff should have conducted an
investigation at that time to reveal all deficiencies and causes of actions, rather
than allowing the deficiencies to deteriorate further); Russo Farms, Inc. v.
Vineland Bd. of Educ., 675 A.2d 1077, 1092 (N.J. 1996) (“It is not necessary that
the injured party have knowledge of the extent of the injury before the statute
begins to run.”).
58. See Bachertz v. Hayes-Lucas Lumber Co., 201 Minn. 171, 176–78, 275
N.W. 694, 697–98 (1937) (holding that plaintiff’s construction-defect claims were
time-barred because he complained about subpar materials and continually
expressed his dissatisfaction with the faulty construction to the defendant more
than six years before bringing a cause of action). The Bachertz court acknowledged
the same public policy motivations that later drove construction-defect statutes of
limitations legislation: “if one person has a claim against another . . . it would be
inequitable for him to assert such claim after an unreasonable lapse of time,
during which such other has been permitted to rest in the belief that no such
claim existed.” Id. at 176, 697 (citing 4 DUNNELL, MINN. DIG. § 5586 (2d ed. 1927 &
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In 1965, the Minnesota legislature enacted a two-year statute of
limitations for actions related to defects from construction
59
improvements to real property. The original statute provided, in
relevant part:
[N]o action to recover damages for any injury to
property . . . arising out of the defective and unsafe
condition of an improvement to real property . . . shall be
brought against any person performing or furnishing the
design, planning, supervision, or observation of
construction . . . more than two years after discovery
thereof, nor, in any event more than ten years after the
60
completion of such construction.
There is no legislative history to indicate the exact purpose of the
statute, but courts have acknowledged that the statute was enacted
as part of a national trend towards minimizing potential liability for
61
construction companies. It is important to note that since its
enactment, the statute has always provided a distinction between
the two-year statute of limitations and the ten-year statute of
62
repose, which is now triggered upon a defined date of substantial
63
completion. While the statute of limitations has been substantively
amended since its enactment, the limitation period has remained

Supp. 1932)).
59. Act of May 21, 1965, ch. 564, § 1, 1965 Minn. Laws 803, 803 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 541.051 (1965)).
60. Id.
61. See Pac. Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 554
(Minn. 1977) (discussing the history of courts’ treatment of concerns about
potential liability of builders and contractors and the resulting legislative
response); Kittson Cty. v. Wells, Denbrook & Assocs., 308 Minn. 237, 241–42, 241
N.W.2d 799, 802 (1976) (“While we have no legislative history to enlighten us as to
the exact purpose of the statute, we note that at least 30 jurisdictions have recently
enacted similar statutes.”). The Kittson County court noted that other jurisdictions
enacted these statutes in response to the gradual disappearance of the privity-ofcontract doctrine which had previously shielded builders from third-party liability.
Kittson Cty., 308 Minn. at 241–42, 241 N.W.2d at 802; see also supra Section II.A.
62. The original statute provided that no cause of action can be brought
“more than two years after discovery thereof, nor, in any event more than ten years
after the completion of such construction.” 1965 Minn. Laws at 803 (emphasis added).
63. MINN. STAT. § 541.051 subdiv. 1(a) (2016) (stating that date of substantial
completion is determined by “the date when construction is sufficiently completed
so that the owner or the owner’s representative can occupy or use the
improvement for the intended purpose”).
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stagnant, and the “completion” or “substantial completion” trigger
64
has never been applied past the statute of repose.
The legislature’s first attempt to simultaneously protect
builders’ and owners’ claims was immediately met with confusion
in the courts. In 1976, the Minnesota Supreme Court first
considered questions regarding the scope and application of the
65
statute in Kittson County v. Wells, Denbrook & Associates. Despite the
66
all-encompassing language of the statute, the Kittson court
doubted that the state legislature intended the statute to apply to
67
all causes of actions. The court based this assumption on the fact
that similar statutes in other jurisdictions contained specific
68
language to encompass additional causes of action. Resting on the
assumption that the legislature did not intend that the statute be
broadly applicable, the court evaluated the purpose and language
of the statute and determined that the statute was only intended to
69
apply to tort actions.

64. See Act of Apr. 22, 2013, ch. 21, § 1, 2013 Minn. Laws 1, 1–2; Act of May
22, 2007, ch. 140, art. 8, § 29, 2007 Minn. Laws 1, 122–23; Act of May 18, 2007, ch.
105, § 4, 2007 Minn. Laws 1, 2–3; Act of May 13, 2004, ch. 196, § 1, 2004 Minn.
Laws 356, 357; Act of Apr. 26, 1990, ch. 555, § 13, 1990 Minn. Laws 1557, 1562; Act
of Apr. 24, 1988, ch. 607, § 1, 1988 Minn. Laws 680, 680–81; Act of Apr. 18, 1988,
ch. 547, § 1, 1988 Minn. Laws 492, 492; Act of Mar. 25, 1986, ch. 455, § 92, 1986
Minn. Laws 840, 885–86; Act of Apr. 7, 1980, ch. 518, § 2, 1980 Minn. Laws 595,
596; Act of May 5, 1977, ch. 65, § 8, 1977 Minn. Laws 107, 110.
65. Kittson Cty., 308 Minn. at 241, 241 N.W.2d at 799.
66. 1965 Minn. Laws at 803, invalidated by Pac. Indem. Co. v. ThompsonYaeger, Inc. 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1977) (stating “no action” can be brought
unless the type of action is specified). The Kittson court observed that “the statute
does not clearly specify what kinds of actions and what types of parties fall within
its limitation provisions” and held that the statute’s construction should be
interpreted narrowly based on similar statutes in other jurisdictions. See Kittson
Cty., 308 Minn. at 241, 241 N.W.2d at 799.
67. See Kittson Cty., 308 Minn. at 240–41, 241 N.W.2d at 801–02 (holding that
the statute did not clearly specify the applicable causes of action, so the reach of
the statute should be narrowly construed to maintain its constitutionality).
68. Id. at 242–243, 241 N.W.2d at 802 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1.1
(West 1952)) (“No action whether in contract, in tort, or otherwise . . .”).
69. Id. at 242, 241 N.W.2d at 802 (“[W]e therefore confine its application to
tort actions by persons not in privity with the party asserting the statute as a bar.”).
The court noted that the statute specifically mentioned “injury,” which it
interpreted as legislative intent to apply the statute to tort actions only. Id. at 241,
241 N.W.2d at 801.
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While the Kittson court briefly cautioned that a constitutional
70
issue regarding the statute of repose could arise in a future case, it
was not until Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc. that the
71
court fully examined the constitutional issue. The Pacific Indemnity
court once again evaluated cases from surrounding jurisdictions
72
that involved attacks on the constitutionality of similar statutes.
The court held that the statute violated the Equal Protection
73
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It reasoned that the statute
singled out and granted immunity only to certain parties listed in
the statute, and it left other parties who might be subject to similar
lawsuits, such as owners and materials suppliers, completely open
74
to liability. Consequently, the court found that the statute’s
70. See id. at 240, 241 N.W.2d at 801 (“[Application] of the 10-year
nullification provision might create grave constitutional issues.”).
71. 260 N.W.2d 548, 553–55 (Minn. 1977). Although Pacific Indemnity
centered around the statute’s constitutionality, it is worth noting that the court
also forayed into the issue of what conduct constitutes “an improvement to real
property,” within the meaning of the statute. See id. at 553–54 (discussing and
rejecting the lower court’s application of the law of fixtures in ruling that the
furnace was not an improvement because “it could be easily removed and . . .
[was] not a part of the real property”). While the meaning of “an improvement to
real property” is not relevant to the Barry decision, it is important to recognize the
significant number of challenges that Minnesota courts have faced, and continue
to face, in interpreting and applying this statute. For a discussion on the legislative
history of Minnesota Statutes section 541.051 and the corresponding case law, see
Johansen, supra note 16, at 1562–75. Johansen notes that Minnesota courts have
struggled to achieve unanimity on a number of the statute’s clauses, including the
statute’s causation clause, the trigger for the statute of limitations, the meaning of
“improvement to real property,” and the contribution and indemnity clause. See id.
at 1573. This confusion is documented by the eighteen rulings on this statute
issued by the Minnesota Court of Appeals and the Minnesota Supreme Court
between 1986 and 1988. See id. at 1572.
72. Pac. Indem. Co., 260 N.W.2d at 555. The court noted that of the fifteen
courts that have ruled on the constitutionality of similar statutes, ten have upheld
the statute and only five have found the statute unconstitutional. Id. Of the five
cases that struck down the statute, the court found the following cases to be most
persuasive: Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Corp., 225 N.W.2d 454 (Wis. 1975);
Fujioka v. Kam, 514 P.2d 568 (Haw. 1973); Skinner v. Anderson, 231 N.E.2d 588 (Ill.
1967). Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.; see also Fujioka, 514 P.2d at 571. The Fujioka court explained that
under such a statute, a plaintiff cannot recover from the engineer or contractor,
even if their actions were the cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. Id. Rather, the
owners will be the sole parties required to pay the plaintiff damages, regardless of
their degree of fault or participation in the injury. Id. Considering the facts
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exclusion of owners and material suppliers from its protections
lacked any semblance of rational basis and struck down the statute
75
as unconstitutional.
In 1980, the Minnesota legislature amended the statute to
76
address the ambiguity of scope raised in Kittson County and to
77
remedy the constitutional concerns discussed in Pacific Indemnity.
The relevant part of the statute was amended to read:
[N]o action by any person in contract, tort, or otherwise to
recover damages for any injury to property . . . shall be
brought against any person performing or furnishing the
design, planning, supervision, materials, or observation of
construction . . . or against the owner of the real property more
78
than two years after discovery of the injury . . . .
While this amendment cured all foreseeable constitutional issues, it
79
barely scratched the surface in clarifying the statute’s ambiguity.
80
81
Questions regarding applicability and timing remain widely
contested in the courts.

presented to it, the court could not find any rational basis for treating these
similarly situated parties differently; in the absence of any reasonable distinction
between the classes or any driving public policy, the court found that the statute
was arbitrary and capricious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. Id. at 572.
75. Pac. Indem. Co., 260 N.W.2d at 555 (“[T]he better reasoned position is
embodied in the decisions which hold such statutes to be unconstitutional because
they grant an immunity from suit to a certain class of defendants, without there
being a reasonable basis for that classification.”).
76. Kittson Cty. v. Wells, Denbrook & Assocs., 308 Minn. 237, 241–42, 241
N.W.2d 799, 802 (1976).
77. Johansen, supra note 16, at 1569 (“These legislative changes . . . show
how the legislature rectified constitutional problems with the statute by expanding
its scope to individuals, thereby avoiding equal protection problems.”); see also Act
of May 21, 1965, ch. 564, § 1, 1965 Minn. Laws 803, 803 (codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 541.051 (1965)).
78. Act of Apr. 7, 1980, ch. 518, § 2, 1980 Minn. Laws 596, 596 (amended
language emphasized).
79. Calder v. City of Crystal, 318 N.W.2d 838, 843 (Minn. 1982) (affirming
that the amended statute prevented future equal protection attacks).
80. See Sterling Heights, LLC v. Veit, Nos. A12-0889, A12-0890, 2012 WL
5990311, at *2–3 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2012) (holding that Minnesota Statutes
section 541.051 applied because plaintiff’s contract claim that defendant failed to
disclose defective conditions on the property was an action “arising out of the
defective and unsafe condition of an improvement”); Knoll v. MTS Trucking, Inc.,
No. A10-1736, 2011 WL 3557806, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2011) (holding
that section 541.051 applied over section 541.05 because “[w]hen there is an
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The Original Statute: The Legislature’s First Attempt to Adopt the
Discovery Rule

In Minnesota’s original statute of limitations, the phrase
“discovery thereof” persisted as a source of considerable
inconsistency in the Minnesota court system and, consequently, a
82
source of confusion for owners, builders, and lawyers. Three
different interpretations by Minnesota courts emerged. First,
Minnesota courts interpreted the statute to begin to run at the
83
discovery of damages resulting from the defective condition. The
courts applied this interpretation specifically to actions of negligent
design or construction; courts adhering to this interpretation
emphasized that a negligence action would be subject to dismissal
for failure to state a claim unless plaintiffs were able to demonstrate
84
that damage had resulted from the negligent act. Second, in 1987,
irreconcilable conflict between two statutory provisions, the more particular
provision prevails over the general provision”); Nolan & Nolan v. City of Eagan,
673 N.W.2d 487, 496 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that section 541.051, and not
section 541.05, applied to nuisance and trespass claims arising out of a defective
condition).
81. See infra Section II.D.2.
82. See Bulau v. Hector Plumbing & Heating Co., 387 N.W.2d 659, 661
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986), rev’d, 402 N.W.2d 528 (Minn. 1987) (concluding that the
statute’s reference to “discovery” was ambiguous because a number of events or
conditions were previously mentioned in the statute and relying on legislative
intent to ascertain the meaning of “discovery”). Further illustrating the confusion
in this area, the Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals’
decision in Bulau. 402 N.W.2d at 530 (“This court, however, has not found this
statute ambiguous.”). See also Keith J. Halleland & Thomas F. Nelson, The Statute of
Limitations in Construction-Related Cases: The Return to Common Law and Common
Sense, HENNEPIN LAW., May–June 1987, at 8, 8 (discussing the inconsistency in
Minnesota jurisprudence regarding the interpretation of “discovery thereof”).
83. See Cont’l Grain Co. v. Fegles Constr. Co., 480 F.2d 793, 797 (8th Cir.
1973) (citing Dalton v. Dow Chemical Co., 280 Minn. 147, 158 N.W.2d 580
(1968)); Capitol Supply Co. v. City of St. Paul, 316 N.W.2d 554, 555 (Minn. 1982);
Dalton, 280 Minn. at 153, 158 N.W.2d at 584.
84. See Cont’l Grain Co., 480 F.2d at 797 (noting that although the statute of
limitations usually begins at the time of the negligent act, Minnesota courts have
acknowledged the severity of this rule and have interpreted the statute to begin
once damage has resulted); see also Capitol Supply Co., 316 N.W.2d at 555 (“The
statutory time period begins to run from the date that the plaintiff first suffers
damage and not from the date when the last known negligent act occurs.”); Dalton,
280 Minn. at 153, 158 N.W.2d at 584 (“[T]he alleged negligence . . . coupled with
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despite these holdings, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued a
group of decisions stating that the statute began to run at the
85
discovery of the defective condition. Even though each of those
decisions involved contribution and indemnity claims rather than
negligence claims, the court never acknowledged its departure
from precedent, nor did it address the reasoning behind the
discrepancy between the “discovery of defective condition”
interpretation and its prior “discovery of resulting damage”
86
interpretation. Third, that same year, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals took an even more conservative approach. The court
concluded that the statute began to run when an expert inspected
the damage and discovered the injury, even though the expert had
87
not yet informed the plaintiffs of his findings.
As illustrated by the three different, but well-supported,
interpretations, the seeming simplicity of “discovery thereof”
created far too much ambiguity to foster unanimity among the
courts. While the legislature addressed the concerns of the Kittson
and Pacific Indemnity courts fairly quickly, it remained silent on the
controversial issue of the commencement of the limitation period
for over twenty years. The diversity in judicial interpretation of
Minnesota Statutes section 541.051 from 1965 to 1987 finally
prompted the legislature to action to clarify the discovery rule.
2.

The 1988 Amendment: The Legislature’s Only Attempt to Clarify
the Discovery Rule

In the last case decided before a 1988 amendment to section
541.051, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the plain reading
of the statute and legislative intent indicated that discovery of the
defective condition, and not the damage it caused, triggered the

the alleged resulting damage is the gravamen in deciding the date upon which the
cause of action at law herein accrues.”).
85. See Ocel v. City of Eagan, 402 N.W.2d 531, 532 (Minn. 1987);
Frederickson v. Alton M. Johnson Co., 402 N.W.2d 794, 796–97 (Minn. 1987); see
also Bulau, 402 N.W.2d at 531.
86. See Pac. Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 555
(Minn. 1977) (citing Fujioka v. Kam, 514 P.2d 568 (Haw. 1973); Skinner v.
Anderson, 231 N.E.2d 588 (Ill. 1967); Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 225
N.W.2d 454 (Wis. 1975)).
86. Pac. Indem. Co., 260 N.W.2d at 555.
87. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. C & A Constr. Co., 412 N.W.2d 52, 55
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
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88

limitations period. Following that opinion, the legislature clarified
its intent contrary to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
interpretation: the statute of limitations is triggered upon discovery
89
of injury, not upon discovery of the defective condition. The
current statute provides, in relevant part, that “no action by any
person . . . to recover damages for any injury to property . . . arising
out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to
real property, shall be brought . . . more than two years after
90
Despite this clarification,
discovery of the injury . . . .”
inconsistency in the application of the statute and interpretation of
“injury” has persisted, and the legislature has avoided amending
the statute to clarify the definition of what precisely constitutes
91
such discovery.
Minnesota courts have often found that discovery of injury is
92
an issue of fact that is inappropriate for summary judgment;
however, there seems to be agreement that the extent of the injury
is a major factor as to whether owners could reasonably believe that
the problem was sufficiently solved to successfully toll the statute of
93
limitations. Courts often look at the frequency and severity of the
94
injury to determine the extent of the injury. Alternatively, or
88. Wittmer v. Ruegemer, 419 N.W.2d 493, 496 (Minn. 1988), superseded by
statute, Act of Apr. 24, 1988, ch. 607, § 1, subdiv. 1(a), 1988 Minn. Laws 680, 680, as
recognized in City of Willmar v. Short-Elliott-Hendrickson, Inc., 475 N.W.2d 73
(Minn. 1991).
89. § 1, subdiv. 1(a), 1988 Minn. Laws at 680. The legislature acknowledged
the confusion caused by the ambiguous nature of the previous statute and entitled
the amendment implementing the discovery rule “[a]n act relating to civil actions;
clarifying the statute of limitations for damages based on services or construction to
improve real property.” Id. (emphasis added).
90. MINN. STAT. § 541.051, subdiv. (1)(a) (2016).
91. See § 1, subdiv. 1(a), 1988 Minn. Laws at 680. The statute only states that
“a cause of action accrues upon discovery of the injury.” MINN. STAT. § 541.051,
subdiv. 1(c).
92. See Lake City Apartments v. Lund-Martin Co., 428 N.W.2d 110, 112
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (concluding that “reasonable minds may differ about the
date of discovery of the injury under the amendments to Minn. Stat. § 541.051”).
93. See, e.g., Buscher v. Montag Dev., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. Ct. App.
2009); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. M.A. Mortenson Co., 545 N.W.2d 394, 398 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1996).
94. See Nolan & Nolan v. City of Eagan, 673 N.W.2d 487, 497 (Minn. Ct. App.
2003) (holding that because plaintiff cited several incidents of frequent, regular,
and permanent flooding over several years before filing suit, his claims were timebarred); see also Hyland Hill N. Condo. Ass’n v. Hyland Hill Co., 538 N.W.2d 479,
484 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that discovery did not trigger the statute of
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conjunctively, courts sometimes look at the owner’s proactive steps,
or lack thereof, to remedy the injury in order to establish if the
95
owner had sufficient notice of the injury. The owner’s initial
reaction to discovery of some defect or notice that a defect may
exist seems to be a heavily weighed factor; owners that appear to
immediately treat the injury as a serious problem but wait several
years to commence a lawsuit generally receive unfavorable
96
outcomes. To avoid adopting a specific governing rule, Minnesota
courts have generally substituted a strictly fact-based contextual
97
analysis.
III. THE 328 BARRY DECISION
A.

Facts and Procedure

328 Barry Avenue, LLC (“328 LLC”) selected Nolan Properties
Group, LLC (“NPG”), both solely owned by John Nolan, to serve as
the general contractor for the construction of a building on its

limitations where leakage was initially sporadic and handled by minor repairs, but
was found when the leak became extensive and irreparable), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 549 N.W.2d 617 (Minn. 1996); see also Lake City, 428 N.W.2d at 112 (holding
that the statute of limitations was triggered by discovery not when plumbing was
altered after leaks occasionally occurred and no further leaks occurred for two
years, but when leaking recommenced and it was discovered that the plumbing
might be defective).
95. Compare Greenbrier Vill. Condo. Two Ass’n v. Keller Inv., Inc., 409
N.W.2d 519, 524–25 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (finding summary judgment
appropriate when owner was on notice of defects from reports clearly indicating
the presence of faulty construction, and owner took steps in attempt to remedy the
problem), and Metro. Life, 545 N.W.2d at 398 (holding that owner’s action was
untimely because owner was aware of the source of the continual and frequent
water damage, took steps to fix the damage through its own employees, and
believed the damage to be significant), with Hyland Hill Co., 538 N.W.2d at 484
(holding that owner took reasonable steps to remedy the roof leaks and brought
timely action when an outside specialist informed owner that the leak had become
extensive and irreparable).
96. See Minch Family LLLP v. Estate of Norby, 652 F.3d 851, 858 (8th Cir.
2011) (holding that plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred because plaintiffs sought
damages for injuries caused by a flooding from almost seven years prior); see also
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 775 v. Holm Bros. Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 660 N.W.2d
146, 151 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that after being informed of multiple
failed heat pumps, the superintendent’s subsequent concern of a “major defect”
constituted discovery of injury and commenced the limitations period).
97. See Lake City, 428 N.W.2d at 112.
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building site. In October 2009, during the “punch list” phase of
construction, NPG contacted Minuti-Ogle Co. (“MOC”), the stucco
100
contractor, about a leak near an east elevation window. A MOC
representative visited the property, observed water coming out by
the window, and told NPG that he thought it might be a window
101
issue. A few days later, after the leak persisted at the same
location, NPG had the same MOC representative return and apply
102
sealant to the window corners. In early November 2009, the MOC
representative and two NPG representatives performed a gardenhose spray test to determine the location of the leak, which
103
revealed water seeping in on the right side of the same window.
Although the record showed no evidence that MOC or any
subcontractor repaired the leak, Nolan testified that the
subcontractors appeared to address the leak because all
subcontractors were paid and 328 LLC observed no leaks between
104
November 2009 and August 2010.
A certificate of occupancy for the building was issued in
January 2010, and 328 LLC began to occupy the building in May
105
2010. In August 2010, 328 LLC noticed water on the floor of the
106
building, and NPG contacted MOC to resolve the issue. The
MOC representative noticed the water was in the same spot as
107
earlier and suggested that NPG “get [the] window tested.” In
response, NPG and 328 LLC hired experts to determine the extent
98. 328 Barry Ave., LLC v. Nolan Props. Grp., LLC, 871 N.W.2d 745, 747
(Minn. 2015). NPG did not perform any of the construction work, but it was
required to select, hire, and supervise subcontractors, and to ensure the
subcontractors’ work was completed according to the contracts. Id.
99. A “punch list” is a “document listing work that does not conform to
contract specifications, usually attached to the certificate of substantial
completion. The contractor must correct the punch list work before receiving
payment.” Punch List, BUSINESSDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.businessdictionary
.com/definition/punch-list (last visited Dec. 2, 2016).
100. 328 Barry, 871 N.W.2d at 747.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. The spray test was performed in response to an e-mail the MOC
representative had received from NPG on October 30 informing him that the
leaking had recommenced at the same window two weeks after his previous visit.
Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 747–48.
106. Id. at 748.
107. Id.
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108

and cause of the water damage. A June 2011 report revealed
109
multiple window leaks, water damage, and other problems. A
June 2012 report documented water damage and further window
110
issues. Based on these reports, 328 LLC sued NPG on June 14,
111
2012, for negligence.
The district court granted NPG’s motion for summary
judgment, holding that the action was untimely under the two-year
112
statute of limitations. The court held there was no genuine issue
of material fact that 328 LLC discovered an actionable injury in fall
113
2009, so its 2012 negligence action was untimely. The court of
114
appeals affirmed.
B.

The Rationale of the Minnesota Supreme Court Holding

In the appeal before the Minnesota Supreme Court, 328 LLC
raised two primary issues: whether a cause of action could accrue
under Minnesota Statutes section 541.051 prior to substantial
completion, and whether summary judgment was appropriate
regarding the timing of 328 LLC’s discovery of an actionable
115
injury. 328 LLC argued that a project must be substantially
complete before an owner can discover an actionable injury rather
than a defective condition, while NPG emphasized that the reading
116
of the plain language of the statute includes no such exemption.
NPG further argued for an expansive definition of “actionable
injury,” such that an actionable injury would occur as soon as a
party is aware of some injury, to support affirming the court of
117
appeals’ decision that 328 LLC’s action was untimely. 328 LLC
maintained that although it was aware of a water leak in November
2009, it did not discover an actionable injury sufficient to trigger
118
the statute of limitations before August 2010.

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 748–49.
Id. at 749–50.
See id. at 752.
Id. at 751.
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Following its analysis of the plain language of the statute, the
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ decision
that construction does not need to be substantially complete before
119
The court relied on
the two-year-limitation period begins.
precedential interpretation of legislative intent in rejecting 328
LLC’s primary argument that although “substantial completion”
did not appear in the statute of limitations, construction must
nevertheless be substantially complete before any actionable injury
120
can be discovered.
After holding that the statute of limitations may begin before
substantial completion, the court then turned to the question of
whether summary judgment was appropriate regarding the timing
121
of 328 LLC’s discovery of an actionable injury. The court held
122
that the timing of the discovery of the injury is a question of fact.
The court relied heavily on the standard for a motion for summary
judgment—to construe the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party—in its evaluation of when 328 LLC knew, or
123
should have known, of the injury. The court then viewed the
evidence in the light most favorable to 328 LLC and concluded that
reasonable minds could differ as to 328 LLC’s discovery of injury
and held that the district court erred in granting summary
124
judgment.
IV. ANALYSIS
A.

Statutory Interpretation of the Statute of Limitations

The Minnesota Supreme Court correctly interpreted the
statute of limitations on construction-defect claims in 328 Barry to

119. Id. at 749–51.
120. See id. at 749–50 (“[W]e cannot add words to an unambiguous statute
under the guise of statutory interpretation.”); see also Seagate Tech., LLC v. W. Dig.
Corp., 854 N.W.2d 750, 759 (Minn. 2014) (“[A] condition expressly mentioned in
one clause of a subdivision provides evidence that the Legislature did not intend
for the condition to apply to other clauses in which the condition is not stated.”);
see also Cty. of Dakota v. Cameron, 839 N.W.2d 700, 709 (Minn. 2013); In re
Stadsvold, 754 N.W.2d 323, 328–29 (Minn. 2008) (“[D]istinctions in language in
the same context are presumed to be intentional.”).
121. 328 Barry, 871 N.W.2d at 751.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 753.
124. Id.
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hold that the statute can begin to run prior to substantial
completion of the construction. First, the court’s holding closely
follows precedent and is supported by strong policy considerations.
Second, the court’s decision correctly mirrors legislative intent to
preserve the important distinction between the statutes of
limitations and of repose.
The court’s decision that the statute of limitations on defective
construction claims does not require that construction be
125
substantially complete accurately reflects the plain language of
the statute. Such a reading also comports with previous Minnesota
126
decisions that assumed the legislature’s passing of the statute was
part of a national trend that reflected the complex public policy
127
behind a strict limitation period. A contrary holding would allow
owners to wait until substantial completion of a lengthy
construction project to bring suit for an injury discovered years
prior when the injury could have been remedied before wasting
material, money, and labor. Such a determination would hold
construction companies unjustifiably liable for unmitigated
damages and would lead to economic waste of labor and
128
resources.
Further, contrary to 328 LLC’s argument, holding that the twoyear statute of limitations is triggered upon substantial completion
129
would render the statute of repose superfluous and would stand
125. Id. at 751.
126. See Fiveland v. Bollig & Sons, Inc., 436 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989). The Fiveland court noted that the legislature deliberately provided two
separate limitations statutes: “one running for two years commencing upon
discovery of the injury; and the other running for 10 years from the substantial
completion of construction.” Id. The court concluded that this was sufficient proof
that the legislature “considered the importance of the time of substantial
completion of construction as a measure for commencing a time period, and has
chosen not to use this point as commencement for the two-year limitation period.”
Id. The court also acknowledged that there had been substantive amendments of
the statute since its enactment, indicating that if the legislature intended that the
two-year limitation period commence upon substantial completion, it would have
expressly and unambiguously amended the statute to provide as such. Id.
127. Kittson Cty. v. Wells, Denbrook & Assocs., Inc., 308 Minn. 237, 241–42,
241 N.W.2d 799, 801 (1976).
128. See 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 14, § 7:174.50.
129. 328 Barry, 871 N.W.2d at 750. 328 LLC argued that “if the statute of
limitations can begin to run during construction, there would be no need for a
statute of repose because all claims would be barred within two years of substantial
completion of construction.” Id.
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in complete contrast to the original public policy objectives of
enacting two distinct statutes. Minnesota courts have consistently
recognized the distinction between the statute of limitations and
the statute of repose and have emphasized the precise policy
131
None of the
objectives that the statute of repose furthers.
concerns that the extended statute of repose was enacted to
132
address exist here; extending the “substantial completion” trigger
in the statute of repose to the statute of limitations would be
133
unnecessary, inconsistent with precedent and national legislative
134
135
intent, and would undermine legitimate policy concerns.
B.

A Missed Opportunity to Adopt a Clearer “Discovery of Injury” Rule

As discussed in this Note, many jurisdictions have expanded
136
the discovery rule to apply to construction-defect claims.
However, the jurisdictions that have adopted the discovery rule
differ substantially in their interpretations of “discovery,” which has
130. See O’Connor, supra note 26, at 7. Statutes of repose were enacted in
response to court decisions exposing building professionals to endless liability,
which ultimately increased the amount of construction lawsuits and created
substantial volatility in prices and parties involved in the insurance market,
resulting in an “insurance crisis.” Id.; see also Michael John Byrne, Let Truth Be Their
Devise: Hargett v. Holland and the Professional Malpractice Statute of Repose, 73 N.C. L.
REV. 2209, 2220 (1995).
131. See Sartori v. Harnischfeger Corp., 432 N.W.2d 448, 454 (Minn. 1988)
(acknowledging that the statute of repose was created to eliminate suits against
building professionals that have completed their work and no longer have any
interest or control in the improvement to owner’s real property); see also Day
Masonry v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 781 N.W.2d 321, 326 (Minn. 2010) (noting that
section 541.051 provides both a statute of limitations and a separate statute of
repose, and that different and distinct triggers commence each statute).
132. See Sartori, 432 N.W.2d at 454. Such policy objectives include (1) avoiding
litigating stale claims and (2) remedying problems in litigation arising from a
substantial lapse of time such as unavailability of witnesses, unavailability of
adequate records, and memory loss. Id.
133. See Fiveland v. Bollig & Sons, Inc., 436 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989).
134. See O’Connor, supra note 26, at 7 (citing Tex. Gas Expl. Corp. v. Fluor
Corp., 828 S.W.2d 28, 32 (Tex. App. 1991)) (explaining that statutes of repose
“represent a response by the legislature to the inadequacy of traditional statutes of
limitation”).
135. See Sartori, 432 N.W.2d at 454; see also supra Section II.A.
136. See Larsen, supra note 42, for a collection and discussion of cases that
have applied the discovery rule in construction-related statutes-of-limitations
issues.
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led to understandable confusion and frustrating inconsistency. Due
to this inconsistency, the case law fails to provide reasonable
expectations of legal rights to both owners and construction
companies. States must amend their statutes of limitations to
include specifics of the discovery rule for the sake of settling
expectations of parties, ensuring continued growth and
industrialization, and fostering goodwill between owners and
construction companies. In the absence of such an amendment it is
the responsibility of states’ highest courts to adopt one controlling
interpretation of discovery when an appropriate constructiondefect case, such as 328 Barry, presents itself.
Due to the inconsistency in their interpretations of “discovery
of injury” in construction-related cases, it is imperative that
Minnesota courts adopt specific rules governing such claims that
are reflective of public policy, consistent with precedent, and
adoptive of recent trends. Court holdings on these issues tend to
follow one of two patterns to trigger the limitations period: (1) a
“lower standard” of discovery that requires owners to bring suit
when they are first put on notice of the defect or upon discovery of
some injury; or (2) a “higher standard” of discovery that requires
owners to bring suit only once they have proof of an injury
137
sufficient to maintain a cause of action. The discovery rule is a
mechanism through which legislatures and courts have preserved
the integrity of statutes of limitations and repose without ignoring
the injustice of the unavailability of remedies to innocent
138
homeowners. Both standards emulate this policy to some extent,
but the higher standard prioritizes a homeowner’s access to an
equitable remedy.
1.

A Lower Discovery Standard: Costs and Benefits

Courts that adhere to the lower standard generally emphasize
the policy justifications of statutes of limitations and favor a strict
139
construction of statutory time bars. Such courts expect owners to
137. See supra Sections II.C, II.D. But see State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. C & A
Const. Co., Inc., 412 N.W.2d 52, 55 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
138. See 1000 Virginia Ltd. P’hip v. Vertecs Corp., 146 P.3d 423, 430 (Wash.
2006) (quoting Ruth v. Dight, 453 P.2d 631, 634 (Wash. 1969)) (“A court must
consider the goal of the common law ‘to provide a remedy for every genuine
wrong’ while recognizing, at the same time, that ‘compelling one to answer stale
claims in the courts is in itself a substantial wrong.’”).
139. See, e.g., Georgetowne P’ship v. Geotechnical Serv., Inc., 430 N.W.2d 34,
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be vigilant in their supervision of the construction and immediate
in their response to discovery of any defect or warning of the
140
possibility of a defect.
The support of the lower discovery standard rests heavily on
general justifications for strict observance of statutes of
141
As discussed earlier in this Note, statutes of
limitations.
limitations and repose were initially passed in response to builder
complaints of exposure to endless liability and spiking insurance
142
costs. Statutes of limitations and repose thus served as a means of
143
revitalizing the construction industry and promoting growth.
Relying on the predictability and stability that these statutes
provide, construction companies are now able to save money by
disposing of old documents and spending less on insurance
144
premiums. In turn, this extra money allows builders to engage in
more projects, without the fear of being hit with an unexpected
lawsuit, and dedicate more resources and higher quality materials
145
to completing these projects. While this commerce theory is
persuasive and particularly attractive to state legislatures, it will
cease to be a legitimate justification if legislative inaction and
judicial apathy to owners’ concerns continue for much longer. The
current dearth of legal protections may cause owners to refrain
from investing in construction projects for fear of the unavailability
of an adequate remedy.
39 (Neb. 1988) (analyzing the legislative intent, which favored a strict construction
of statutory time bars).
140. See, e.g., id. (holding that knowledge of the existence of an injury, not the
existence of a “legal right to seek redress in court,” constitutes discovery). Even
stricter, the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that the statute of limitations begins
to run merely when facts exist to lead a reasonable person to investigate, which
would lead to discovery. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Neb. v. Wilscam Mullins Birge,
Inc., 433 N.W.2d 478, 484 (Neb. 1988).
141. See Georgetowne, 430 N.W.2d at 37; see also Wilscam Mullins, 433 N.W.2d at
483–84.
142. See supra Section II.A.
143. See Michael F. Lutz, Restore Colorado’s Repair Doctrine for Construction-Defect
Claims, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 875, 890 (2012) (noting that the intent of the statutes
of limitations and repose is to promote commerce).
144. Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 24, at 469 (discussing the negative impact
of uncertainty and old claims on insurance costs). Ochoa and Wistrich also note
that statutes of limitations allow potential defendants to destroy burdensome
records without the fear of being penalized. Id. at 470.
145. Cf. id. at 466–67 (noting that uncertainty inhibits a potential defendant’s
ability to pursue new ventures or economically allocate resources).
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Proponents of a lower discovery standard also reason that a
more liberal standard would incentivize owners to neglect their
responsibility to exercise reasonable diligence in inspecting their
146
properties in order to extend the limitation period. This lower
standard, proponents argue, holds owners to a higher degree of
responsibility, requiring them to consistently and thoroughly
inspect their properties. Supporting this idea, one court held that
statutes of limitations simply “reflect[] a policy decision regarding
what constitutes an adequate period of time for a person of
147
However, this
ordinary diligence to pursue his claim.”
justification operates under the assumption that any construction
defect can be discovered through reasonable diligence within the
allotted time. This assumption ignores an important policy
justification of the discovery rule, which is to protect diligent
owners who are unable to discover the injury due to lack of
148
expertise or the undetectable nature of the injury. Additionally,
this assumption begins to erode the distinction between the
harshness of the traditional rule, where the statute of limitations is
immediately triggered upon the occurrence of the wrongful act
149
causing the injury, and the fairness of the discovery rule. Critics
146. See Melrose Hous. Auth. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 520 N.E.2d 493, 498 (Mass.
1988) (quoting Fulcher v. United States, 696 F.2d 1073, 1077 (4th Cir. 1982)) (“A
man should not be allowed to close his eyes to facts readily observable by ordinary
attention, and maintain for his own advantage the position of ignorance. Such a
principle would enable a careless man, and by reason of his carelessness, to extend
his right to recover for an indefinite length of time, and thus defeat the very
purpose the statute was designed and framed to accomplish.” (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
147. Lumsden v. Design Tech Builders, Inc., 749 A.2d 796, 799 (Md. 2000)
(quoting Goldstein v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 404 A.2d 1064, 1069 (Md. 1979));
see Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 464 A.2d 1020, 1026 (Md. 1983)
(discussing that the limitation period is a product of balancing fairness to
potential defendants with preventing injustice to potential diligent plaintiffs).
148. See Ehrenhaft v. Malcolm Price, Inc., 483 A.2d 1192, 1203 (D.C. 1984).
The court in Ehrenhaft emphasized the fact that owners must rely on the skills and
advice of the professionals they hire and likely do not possess the expertise to
immediately identify defective construction or design. Id. The court also noted
that due to the latent nature of some defects, even the most diligent owner would
not be able to detect such defects for a number of years. Id.
149. See Leaf v. City of San Mateo, 163 Cal. Rptr. 711, 715 (Ct. App. 1980)
(“The traditional rule . . . is that the statute of limitations begins to run upon the
occurrence of the last fact essential to the cause of action. Although sometimes
harsh, the fact that plaintiff is neither aware of his cause of action nor of the
identity of a wrongdoer will not toll the statute. . . . The harshness of this rule has
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of this approach also caution that a lower standard of being aware
of some injury would require owners to sue any party they believe
could have contributed to the injury to prevent losing their claims
150
under the statute of limitations.
Overall, a lower discovery standard would inevitably lead to
frivolous lawsuits, judicial inefficiency, and a substantial waste of
money and resources on behalf of owners and construction
151
companies.
2.

A Higher Discovery Standard: Costs and Benefits

As the demand for construction services has increased
exponentially in the past two decades, so too have the number of
152
construction-defect lawsuits. While the lower standard directly
responds to builders’ concerns prior to the enactment of statutes of
repose regarding exposure to endless liability, the higher standard
importantly addresses more recent and prevalent issues from the
past twenty years. The pressure to remain competitive and efficient
in a booming industry has led construction companies to
underestimate the time to complete a project, use cheaper and
more defect-prone materials, and understaff projects that would
153
typically warrant a quality control expert or supervisor. The result
been ameliorated in some cases where it is manifestly unjust to deprive plaintiffs of
a cause of action before they are aware that they have been injured.”).
150. Id.
151. Cf. Hyland Hill N. Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Hyland Hill Co., 538 N.W.2d 479,
484 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (comparing a more lenient discovery standard to the
doctrine of mutual mistake, which “promotes economic efficiency by allowing
parties to enter freely into contracts without first going to the prohibitive expense
of carefully investigating every fact assumption”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 549
N.W.2d 617 (Minn. 1996).
152. See, e.g., Robert J. Aalberts, “To Sue or Not to Sue”: The Past, Present and
Future of Construction Defect Litigation in Nevada, 5 NEV. L.J. 684, 684–85 (2005). In
Clark County, Nevada, nearly 170 construction-defect lawsuits were filed between
2000 and 2001. Id. (citing Robert Gavin, Home Builders Face Insurance Woes, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 27, 2002, at B7).
153. Cf. Darin T. Allen, Construction Defects Litigation and the “Right to Cure”
Revolution, CONSTRUCTION BRIEFINGS, Mar. 2006, ¶ 8 (2006) (In response to the
frequency and normalcy of construction defect litigation, the number of lawyers
specializing in this area of law has increased as well.); Mario Menanno, New and
Emerging Issues: Top Trends in Construction Cases, DRI FOR DEF., Mar. 2016, at 78
(“The principal lesson to be learned from . . . recent construction law trends is
that this area of the law is rapidly changing, and attorneys should not only be
aware of these changes, but they also should be actively participating in molding
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has inevitably been an increase in construction and design defects.
However, as owners tend to not be construction experts, they often
fail to identify defects and lose the right to remedy due to strict
154
statutes of limitations. As such, the rigidity of and the lack of
specification in these statutes of limitations have unwittingly
encouraged owners to immediately pursue litigation rather than
attempt to remedy the problem in a less costly and hostile manner
155
outside of the court system.
In acknowledgement of the national emergence of increased
construction litigation, states have enacted a variety of statutes to
curb the number of lawsuits, encourage parties to work together
156
again, and promote industry growth. A higher discovery standard
aligns with the purposes of these statutes. Requiring owners to have
the basis of a cause of action for a construction-defect claim before
commencing the limitation period necessitates a degree of
certainty as to the legitimacy of the claim. Moreover, a higher
discovery standard discourages owners from filing frivolous or
impulsive lawsuits, which will ultimately increase judicial economy
and decrease litigation costs for all parties.
Not only would a higher standard decrease litigation for
builders, but it would also protect owners’ legitimate claims. Courts
that have embraced a higher standard generally take a more
balanced approach: they acknowledge the importance of statutes of
limitations but also consider individual circumstances and other
157
relevant factors. These courts have acknowledged that there are
the law.”); Melissa C. Tronquet, Comment, There’s no Place Like Home . . . Until You
Discover Defects: Do Prelitigation Statutes Relating to Construction Defect Cases Really
Protect the Needs of Homeowners and Developers?, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1249, 1262
(2004).
154. See Allen, supra note 153, ¶ 1.
155. See Aalberts, supra note 152, at 686 (noting that in many cases, only
owners who have financial resources have the luxury of pursuing litigation).
Aalberts notes that during the rise of construction litigation, despite litigation only
being a viable option for some owners, the financial costs and the damage to
construction companies’ reputations created animosity towards all owners
complaining about defects. Id. at 687. As a result, when owners tried to pursue
amicable remedies outside of the court system, such as asking builders to fix the
problem, builders were sometimes reluctant to cooperate. Id.
156. See Menanno, supra note 153; see also Tronquet, supra note 153, at 1263.
157. See supra Sections II.C–D. Minnesota courts have looked at a number of
extraneous factors, including public policy, comparative jurisprudence, and recent
history. See Ehrenhaft v. Malcolm Price, Inc., 483 A.2d 1192, 1203 (D.C. 1984)
(holding that a liberal discovery rule applies after balancing the burden to the
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158

limits to an owner’s ability to be diligent. An owner cannot be
expected to shoulder the entire burden of supervision, particularly
when the owner has entrusted paid construction professionals to
159
perform defect-free work on personal property. In cases where
diligence is not the issue, owners should not worry about losing
claims for defects that they could not have been aware of. Such
situations can occur when a manifestation of a defect is not obvious
160
or when an injury is temporarily abated but
to the owner
161
recurring over a period of time.
3.

The 328 Barry Decision’s Bearing on the Discovery of Injury
Standard

In 328 Barry, the Minnesota Supreme Court correctly found
that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the timing
162
of 328 LLC’s discovery of an actionable injury. However, in its
discussion on this matter, the court should have addressed the
impact of its strict statute of limitations holding on Minnesota’s
standard for “discovery” of actionable injury. If the statute of
limitations can begin before substantial completion, the standard
for discovery of actionable injury must be higher. The court
alluded to a higher standard by distinguishing the present case
from a prior case where discovery of injury was found immediately
163
after completion of construction, but the court failed to explicitly
defendant of defending an older claim with the practical purposes of statutes of
limitations).
158. See supra Sections II.C–D.
159. See Ehrenhaft, 483 A.2d at 1202 (noting that an owner should not be
reasonably expected to hire additional experts to oversee the construction work).
160. See Performing Arts Ctr. Auth. v. Clark Constr. Grp., 789 So.2d 392, 394
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (“Where the manifestation is not obvious but could be
due to causes other than an actionable defect, notice as a matter of law may not be
inferred.”).
161. Kulpinski v. City of Tarpon Springs, 473 So.2d 813, 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (holding that the owner was entitled to a cause of action for damages
for each recurrence of the damage during the limitation period, even though suit
was filed outside of the one-year limitation period after the owner first noticed the
injury).
162. 328 Barry Ave., LLC v. Nolan Props. Grp., LLC, 871 N.W.2d 745, 753
(Minn. 2015).
163. Id. at 752 (citing Day Masonry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 347, 781 N.W.2d 321,
334 (Minn. 2010) (holding that the school district’s claims were time-barred
because it discovered the problem as soon as the school opened but failed to bring
suit until several years later)).
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establish any definite rule defining Minnesota’s discovery
164
standard.
As strict interpretations of statutes of limitations and the
incorporation of statutes of repose exist to protect construction
165
companies from unjustifiable liability exposure, so too should
lenient interpretations of “discovery of injury” exist to allow owners
to hold construction companies accountable for legitimate claims
166
of actual injury. Thus, to equalize legal protections for both
parties, Minnesota courts should adopt the higher standard for
167
Minnesota’s discovery rule. While Minnesota courts have differed
in their approaches in the past, taking a firm stance on this
interpretation would be consistent with precedent, would be good
public policy, and would provide invaluable guidance for inevitable
168
The Minnesota
future construction litigation in Minnesota.
Supreme Court missed an important opportunity to take a firm
stance and adopt the higher standard as Minnesota’s discovery rule.
C.

In Support of a Higher Discovery of Injury Standard: Through the
Lens of a Minnesota Court

The Minnesota Supreme Court could adopt the higher
standard through an interpretation of Minnesota Statutes section
541.051. Applying the higher standard for the discovery rule in

164. Id.
165. Marianne M. Jennings, Reposing: An Evolving Issue, 34 REAL EST. L.J. 470,
471 (2006). Jennings also cites concern about the decline in services provided by
construction companies as a result of high costs of insurance and litigation as an
argument for enacting of statutes of limitations. Id. at 470.
166. Peggy Rose Revocable Tr. v. Eppich, 640 N.W.2d 601, 608 (Minn. 2002)
(citing Schmucking v. Mayo, 183 Minn. 37, 40, 235 N.W. 633, 634 (1931))
(discussing the rationale of the discovery rule in preventing the preclusion of
legitimate claims by aggrieved parties before they even know they have a valid
claim).
167. But cf. Harvard Law Review Ass’n, Developments in the Law Statutes of
Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1205 (1950) (“As between the duly diligent
plaintiff and the wrongdoer, the courts have been unnecessarily sympathetic
towards the latter, in shortening the period in which it is likely that the plaintiff
will bring an action or in entirely depriving the plaintiff of a practical remedy.”).
168. See Greenbrier Vill. Condo. Two Ass’n v. Keller Inv., Inc., 409 N.W.2d
519, 523 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Bulau v. Hector Plumbing & Heating Co.,
402 N.W.2d 528, 530 (Minn. 1987)) (“In Minnesota, the harshness of [the statute
of limitations] has been recognized and . . . the statute begins to run when some
damage occurs which would entitle the victim to maintain a cause of action.”).
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Minnesota would not be judicial legislation. This Section examines
the higher standard as an issue of statutory interpretation as
though it were before a Minnesota court. This analysis relies solely
on factors that Minnesota courts have considered when
interpreting section 541.051.
1.

Legislative Intent

Significant literature exists explaining the intent behind the
initial passage of statutes of limitations in construction-defect
169
litigation. Minnesota courts have duly accepted that the primary
motivations behind the original enactment of Minnesota Statutes
section 541.051 were (1) the erosion of the privity-of-contract
doctrine and (2) the need to establish protections for builders
170
against endless liability. However, the changing climate of the
construction industry in the 1980s spurred a change in policy
171
considerations. When clarifying the discovery rule in 1988, the
legislature’s primary goal was no longer protecting construction
industry professionals but “to handle fairly and predictably the
172
various circumstances that can arise in construction litigation.”
In amending the discovery rule, the legislature considered
various hypothetical situations in which a construction-defect
lawsuit might arise. The legislature discussed three likely situations:
(1) a cause of action arising out of a personal injury caused by a
sudden event; (2) a cause of action arising out of economic loss
caused by a sudden event; and (3) a cause of action arising out of
173
an economic loss not caused by a sudden event. The evaluation
of these diverse hypotheticals indicates an intent to account for
many types of property owners and protect as many legitimate
169. See supra Sections II.A, II.C.
170. See Kittson Cty. v. Wells, Denbrook & Assocs., 308 Minn. 237, 241–42, 241
N.W.2d 799, 802 (1976).
171. See Johansen, supra note 16, at 1572–73 (discussing the sharp increase in
construction-defect litigation following the construction boom of the 1980s).
172. See Halleland & Nelson, supra note 82, at 28. Halleland and Nelson note
that the legislature’s purpose was also to clarify that, contrary to judicial
presumption, the statute was not intended to “abrogate” the common law. Id.
173. Id. The first two hypotheticals assume that the discovery of the injury will
be obvious, coinciding with the occurrence of the sudden event. Id. In the third
hypothetical, the limitations period is triggered upon discovery of an injury
sufficient to maintain a cause of action. Id. Halleland and Nelson reason that the
third hypothetical reaffirms a recent decision that “punch list” items should not
form the basis for a cause of action. Id.
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claims as possible. The particular consideration the legislature gave
to owners who do not discover the injury for several years by no
fault of their own but due to the latent nature of the defect
demonstrates a deliberate commitment to furthering the policy
174
The legislature’s careful
objectives of the discovery rule.
consideration of protecting claims arising from both obvious and
subtle injuries signifies an inclusive trend and a rejection of a
stringent construction of the statute to which Minnesota courts
previously adhered.
2.

Precedent

Although Minnesota case law has been somewhat inconsistent
since the 1988 amendment, patterns have emerged, and underlying
175
trends have become more apparent. On the surface, case law
from the past ten years appears to indicate a trend towards time176
barring most claims. However, an evaluation of the specific facts
behind these holdings reveals underlying trends reflective of public
policy. In a majority of the recent construction-defect cases, the
courts based their decisions heavily on what the owner actually
knew about the injury and how the owner responded to that
177
knowledge. If the owner was informed of either the existence of
an extensive injury or the development of a potentially grave injury
from a credible source, courts have generally agreed that this
178
knowledge constitutes discovery. Many courts have taken the

174. See Ehrenhaft v. Malcolm Price, Inc., 483 A.2d 1192, 1202 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (noting that the discovery rule aligns with notions of justice in that it
recognizes the difficulty in discovering a latent construction deficiency).
175. See supra Section II.D.
176. See generally Minch Family LLLP v. Estate of Norby, 652 F.3d 851 (8th Cir.
2011); Day Masonry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 347, 781 N.W.2d 321 (Minn. 2010);
Glendalough Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Nassar, No. A15-0230, 2015 WL 7357196
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2015); Sterling Heights, LLC v. Veit, No. A12-0889, 2012
WL 5990311 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2012).
177. See infra notes 180, 181, 183 and accompanying text.
178. See Glendalough, 2015 WL 7357196, at *2 (holding that plaintiff
discovered the injury after an engineer he had hired to survey his damaged
landscaping informed him of the sources of the damage and warned him that the
defects would devalue his home and “potentially create an unsafe situation”); see
also Sterling Heights, 2012 WL 5990311, at *4 (holding that plaintiff’s claims were
time-barred because plaintiff received reports of the defects from two separate
sources in 2003 and was informed of these defects again in 2006 when he hired an
expert to inspect the building but failed to bring suit until 2010).
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inquiry one step further, finding that if the owner responds to a
problem as though he or she believes it to be serious, discovery is
179
found at the time of that response.
Despite initial impressions, these holdings are not an
indication that Minnesota courts are less sympathetic to the plight
of homeowners faced with damaging and costly construction
180
defects. In fact, in Fuhr v. D.A. Smith Builders, Inc., the Minnesota
Court of Appeals explicitly rejected the idea that “the legislature
intended to require homeowners to engage in an exhaustive
investigation absent facts that would place a reasonable person on
181
notice that such an investigation is prudent.” This plaintiffcentered approach goes no further than ensuring that owners do
182
not sit on their rights. The focus on the actions of the owner, as
opposed to the extent or nature of the injury, corresponds with the
proposed higher standard and mirrors the underlying policy
179. See Minch, 652 F.3d at 858 (holding that the date of discovery of injury
was the date plaintiffs first complained to the Watershed District about the
flooding); Smith v. Lindstrom Cleaning and Constr., Inc., No. A07-1122, 2008 WL
2020493, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. May 12, 2008) (holding that discovery was found
when plaintiff wrote a letter to her insurance agent stating that she firmly believed
that the mold causing her health problems was a direct result of defendant’s
construction). But see Lake City Apartments v. Lund-Martin Co., 417 N.W.2d 704,
708 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that plaintiff acted as a responsible property
owner by installing a valve that appeared to fix the leak and therefore plaintiff’s
claims did not begin to accrue until the leaks occurred again two years later). The
court in Lake City Apartments noted that plaintiff would not have been able to
maintain a cause of action if it had brought suit after it reasonably believed it had
repaired the problem and the defect appeared to be fixed. Id.
180. Cf. Ehrenhaft v. Malcolm Price, Inc., 483 A.2d 1192, 1202 (D.C. 1984)
(noting that under the discovery rule, courts take into consideration the fact that
owners are generally not construction experts and must rely on the expertise and
advice of professionals in the field).
181. No. A04-2457, 2005 WL 3371035, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2005)
(holding that a genuine issue of material fact as to date of discovery existed where
owners promptly fixed what they understood to be the problem after noticing
water damage, did not experience water damage for over four years, and then
discovered extensive water damage and received reports identifying the cause of
the damage).
182. The Fuhr court reasoned that “[a] contrary result would force Fuhrs to
choose between taking what they claim was a prudent corrective action and then
being barred by the statute of limitations from further claims, and undertaking an
exhaustive, invasive inspection of their entire home, including tearing out
sheetrock and insulation to determine whether systemic problems exist.” Id.; see
also Ehrenhaft, 483 A.2d at 1203 (“A plaintiff who will benefit by invocation of the
discovery rule will not be one who has ‘sat’ on his rights to gain legal advantage.”).
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objectives behind the original purpose of these statutes: prompt
investigation into construction defects to ensure low-cost and timeefficient litigation of these matters as amicably and fairly as
183
possible.
3.

Common-Sense Approach

The Minnesota Supreme Court first adopted the common184
sense approach in Kloster-Madsen, Inc. v. Tafi’s, Inc. in 1975. The
court was tasked with determining whether work performed by an
electrician constituted an “improvement” within the meaning of
185
Minnesota Statutes section 514.05. To make this determination,
the court relied on the dictionary definition of “improvement”
186
compounded with its implicit definition in the statute. The court
then revisited this common-sense approach in Pacific Indemnity,
affirming the utility of this approach in evaluating the language of
187
this statute.
As Minnesota courts have repeatedly relied on this interpretive
tool, the same common-sense approach can be applied here to
lend clarity to the phrase “discovery of injury.” By dictionary
definition, “injury” is “hurt, damage, or loss sustained” or the
“violation of another’s rights for which the law allows an action to
188
Applying that definition to the phrase
recover damages.”
“discovery of injury” as it is used in the statute, “injury” warrants the
183.
184.
185.
186.

Halleland & Nelson, supra note 82, at 8.
303 Minn. 59, 63, 226 N.W.2d 603, 606 (1975).
Id.
Id. at 63–64, 226 N.W.2d at 607 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L
DICTIONARY 1138 (1971)) (defining improvement as a mixed question of fact and
law).
187. Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 554
(Minn. 1977) (quoting Kloster-Madsen, 303 Minn. at 63, 226 N.W.2d at 607) (“[A]n
improvement is ‘a permanent addition to or betterment of real property that
enhances its capital value and that involves the expenditure of labor or money and
is designed to make the property more useful or valuable as distinguished from
ordinary repairs.’”), superseded by statute, MINN. STAT. § 541.051, as recognized in
Siewert v. N. States Power Co., 793 N.W.2d 272, 286 (Minn. 2011). The Pacific
Indemnity court noted that this “common usage” approach had also been recently
adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 260 N.W.2d at 554 (citing Kallas
Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 225 N.W.2d 454, 456 (Wis. 1975)). The Minnesota
Supreme Court implemented Wisconsin’s common-sense approach to determine
that the installation of a furnace constituted an improvement to real property. Id.
http://www.merriam-webster.com
188. Injury,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM,
/dictionary/injury (last visited Oct. 11, 2016).
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showing of some loss or damage that would allow the plaintiff to
maintain a cause of action. Looking no further than the plain
language of the statute, observation or notice of any defect is not
enough to form the basis of an action to recover damages. Rather,
this definition warrants the necessity of investigation by the owner
to ascertain whether or not the defect actually caused some damage
or loss to avoid dismissal for failure to state a cause of action. Thus,
the common-sense interpretation of “discovery of injury” rejects the
lower standard of requiring owners to bring suit upon awareness of
189
some injury and more closely aligns with the higher proof of
injury standard.
4.

Recent Developments in the Law

Prior to the Minnesota legislature passing the original statute
of limitations, construction professionals had little to no legal
190
protections to shield them from endless liability. In light of the
dire state of construction companies at that time, statutes that
heavily favored builders were long past due. Balancing the legal
protections of both construction companies and owners was not
191
the focus or even a priority. Rather, the sole objective of these
192
statutes was drastically limiting builders’ exposure to liability.
However, today’s climate is much different. The construction
industry has been revitalized, and significant legal protections exist
193
to insulate builders. Although legislatures acted fairly quickly to

189. The defendants in 328 Barry urged the court to adopt the reasoning that
discovery begins as “long as [the party] is aware of some injury.” 328 Barry Ave.,
LLC v. Nolan Properties Grp., LLC, 871 N.W.2d 745, 752 (Minn. 2015) (citing Day
Masonry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 347, 781 N.W.2d 321, 334 (Minn. 2010)). However,
the 328 Barry defendants misunderstood the Day Masonry court’s holding, so their
reliance on Day Masonry was misplaced. The court in Day Masonry held that
discovery began when plaintiff was aware of both the problem and “the need to
take action to repair the problem.” 781 N.W.2d at 334.
190. See supra Section II.A.
191. See Ali v. City of Detroit, 554 N.W.2d 384, 387 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996)
(“[T]he statute is not designed to protect owners of the property, building, or
improvement.”).
192. Id. (citing Witherspoon v. Guilford, 511 N.W.2d 720, 723–24 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1994)) (“The purpose of the statute of repose is to shield architects,
engineers, and contractors from stale claims and relieve them of open-ended
liability for defects in workmanship.”).
193. See Allen, supra note 153, ¶¶ 1–2 (discussing variations of “right to cure”
laws designed to shield construction professionals from excessive legislation).
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remedy builders’ concerns in the 1960s, few statutes have been
194
passed to address recent homeowner plights. Most notably, many
states have enacted home warranty statutes over the past twenty
195
years in an attempt to protect purchasers of homes. However,
many of these laws conflict with time limits in statutes of limitations
and repose and are therefore too ambiguous to provide owners
196
with reasonable expectations. In Minnesota, the home warranty
statute has received criticism that it does not provide a complete, or
197
even sufficient, remedy to homeowners.
Embedded within these home warranty statutes, many states
have also enacted “right to cure” or “notice and opportunity to
repair” laws, which require owners to provide builders with written
194. See Boyer, supra note 35, at 28 n.4.
195. See Charles L. Armstrong, Comment, Who Pays the Price for Defective Home
Construction? A Note on Buecher v. Centex Homes, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 687, 701
(2001) (noting that statutory warranties intend to protect consumers and
incentivize sellers and builders to provide defect-free products). But see Amy L.
McDaniel, Note, The New York Housing Merchant Warranty Statute: Analysis and
Proposals, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 754, 754 (1990) (cautioning that New York’s home
warranty statute failed to protect consumer rights and did not encourage builders
to construct defect-free homes).
196. See Boyer, supra note 35, at 29 (noting that the overlap of constructiondefect claims arising from home warranty statutes and statutes of limitation and
repose has prompted many states to clarify when each statute applies). Boyer notes
that some states have specified that breach of warranty claims resulting in defects
supersede other statutes of limitations or repose. Id. (citing LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:3141 (1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-58-1 (1997); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 777
(1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-70.1 (2011)). Boyer cautions that many states have
been silent on the issue, resulting in ambiguity for homeowners and inconsistency
in the case law. See id. at 30 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-116 (1980); IND. CODE
§ 32-27-2-1 (2016); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 10-601 (West 2002); MINN. STAT.
§ 327A.02 (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:3B-1).
197. See Terri A. Tersteeg, Minnesota’s Moisty, Moldy Morass: A Comment on
Construction Defect Claims in Minnesota, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1551, 1568–71
(2007) (discussing the complexities of home warranty cases in Minnesota and
cautioning that even in best-case scenarios, homeowners do not recoup their
financial losses). Under Minnesota’s home warranty statute, owners lose their right
to recovery if they do not provide written notice to the general contractor within
six months after the owner discovers or should have discovered the damage. MINN.
STAT. § 327A.03 (2016). Tersteeg notes that the courts’ strict adherence to the
written notice requirement has been the cause of injustice in a number of
warranty suits. Tersteeg, supra, at 1568; see also Collins v. Buus, No. A05-1771, 2006
WL 1985431, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. July 18, 2006) (holding that plaintiffs lost their
claim for breach of statutory warranty because they notified their general
contractor of the defect through oral conversation rather than written notice).
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198

notice of a discovered defect prior to filing suit. The builder then
has a statutory period to respond with an inspection, offer to cure
199
the defect, negotiate a settlement, or reject the proposal. State
legislatures passed these statutes in an attempt to curb the
increasing amount of construction-defect litigation by encouraging
parties to remedy construction defects through other avenues, such
200
as mediation or fixing the defect, before resorting to litigation.
These laws were passed in response to builder complaints that
homeowners prematurely file suit upon notice of any source of
dissatisfaction, consequently racking up litigation costs and driving
201
up builder insurance costs. Although these “right to cure” laws
sometimes interfere with the equitable application of statutes of
202
limitations and repose, they ultimately serve as another layer of
203
protection for builders. Despite the fact that the underlying
policy motivations of decreasing excessive litigation are relevant,
urgent, and in the best interest of both parties, these laws have
raised legitimate concerns of inequitable treatment of
204
homeowners. Not only do these laws create additional obstacles
205
for owners with genuine claims, but owners also face steep
198. See Allen, supra note 153, ¶ 2.
199. In many states, builders have thirty days to respond. Id.
200. See Anders v. Superior Court, 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 465, 472 (Ct. App. 2011)
(noting that the legislative history of California’s Right to Repair Act, Sen. Bill No.
800, emphasizes that “builders, insurers, and other business groups are hopeful
that this right to repair will reduce litigation” and that one of the main purposes of
the statute is to “avoid the costs of litigation and the resulting increased costs of
construction”). It is important to note that many of these “right to cure” statutes
are triggered upon an owner’s discovery of a defect after the completion of the
project. See Allen, supra note 153, ¶¶ 2–3.
201. See Boyer, supra note 35, at 31.
202. Id. at 28.
203. Anders, 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 472.
204. See Allen, supra note 153, ¶¶ 33–38 (citing concerns that these laws
enacted to curb litigation seem to only benefit builders); see also Boyer, supra note
35, at 28 (discussing the inequitable result of mandatory notice and opportunity to
repair laws when owners discover claims toward the end of a limitation period).
Boyer cautions that notice and opportunity to repair statutes should include a
mechanism that allows owners bringing a claim near the end of a limitations
period to toll the statute of limitations or repose. Id. at 32. In the absence of such
an exception, owners face the risk of losing legitimate claims and builders are
incentivized to respond in an untimely fashion. Id.
205. See Allen, supra note 153, ¶¶ 4, 33 (noting concerns that these laws are
costly and time-consuming for owners, but afford construction companies
additional legal protections).
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consequences for not complying with the statutory requirements of
206
these laws.
These new laws insinuate that current reform efforts are
focused on decreasing the amount of construction litigation in a
207
manner only favorable to builders. As construction companies
have been subject to less and less liability and accountability for
their alleged wrongful acts, the disparity in bargaining power
208
between builders and owners has continued to increase. The
tables have turned—owners are now the disparaged party in need
209
of legal protections. The higher discovery standard recognizes
this recent shift in circumstances and seeks to equalize the legal
footing of both parties. This approach does not aim to remove any
legal protections for builders; rather, it provides an owner more
leeway to investigate or solve a defect and protects the owner’s right
to redress upon discovery that the defect is grave enough to resort
210
to litigation.
5.

Public Policy

Access to the court system is an important right and should not
be undermined. It is essential to the preservation of our democracy
and Constitution that every American citizen has the ability to
211
exercise her right to be heard in a court of law. However, the
court system does not exist to discourage problem-solving or
212
cooperation between parties; if it did, litigation would be the

206. See id. ¶¶ 19, 22, 37 (discussing that if an owner does not follow each
requirement, the owner will not be allowed to file suit until fully repeating the
statutory process, and that strict adherence to this time-consuming process can
cause owners to lose their claims to the statute of limitations).
207. Boyer, supra note 35, at 29–31 (discussing various legislations in multiple
states and how a contractor is protected under them).
208. See Tersteeg, supra note 197, at 1585 (noting that homeowners’ personal
assets are at risk in construction-defect claims).
209. Id. at 1559 (“Many homeowners have been unhappy to discover that they
have more consumer protections for a fickle $20 toaster than for a home that
turns out to be flawed.”).
210. Boyer, supra note 35, at 31 (“[Notice and opportunity to repair statutes]
require[] an owner to give a builder notice of construction defects and provide an
adequate opportunity for the builder to repair, or refuse to repair, those defects
before the owner may initiate formal proceedings.”).
211. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
212. See Allen, supra note 153, ¶ 1 (noting that construction “defects create
animosity between homeowner and builder, leading many homeowners to pursue
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standard rather than a last resort, and no dispute resolution would
213
take place outside of a courtroom. The heightened pleading
214
standards adopted by the Supreme Court reiterate this concern.
During construction, particularly major construction projects,
it is assumed by all parties involved that there will be minor, fixable
defects throughout the process. Just because an owner is put on
notice of these minor defects, it is not expected that they will bring
215
suit at that time.
On the contrary, it is expected that the
contractors will remedy those minor defects before the “punch list”
216
phase—and certainly before a certificate of occupancy is issued.

litigation without attempting to negotiate for repairs or other remedies”).
213. Id. ¶ 2 (indicating that many states have enacted right to cure provisions
to “prevent unnecessary litigation” and allow the contractor an opportunity to
remedy the defect).
214. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (“While legal conclusions can
provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.”); see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007) (holding
that the plausibility standard requires that the plaintiff pleads enough facts to raise
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the illegal conduct). The
Twombly Court cited concerns of frivolous claims, judicial inefficiency, and
increasing litigation costs as justifications for the heightened pleading standard.
Id. at 562. While the Minnesota Supreme Court recently rejected the Twombly and
Iqbal heightened pleading standard, the same underlying policy concerns are still
present. See Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 606 (Minn. 2014). The
court reasoned that the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure provided sufficient
safeguards against lack of clarity and high discovery costs, including a recent
amendment giving the district court more discretion to manage discovery. Id. at
605–06 (citing MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.05, 26). However, the Twombly court cautioned
that judicial supervision as an attempt to curb discovery abuse has not been that
successful. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as
Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638 (1989)) (“Judges can do little about impositional
discovery when parties control the legal claims to be presented and conduct the
discovery themselves.”).
215. See Linn Reorganized Sch. Dist. No. 2 of Osage Cty. v. Butler Mfg. Co.,
672 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Mo. 1984) (holding that evidence that the roof leaked from
the first day of construction is not sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations).
The court reasoned that requiring an owner to bring suit upon notice of any
defect during the construction “would place upon an aggrieved party the task of
piecemeal litigation. . . . [A] claimant would have to sue a roofer within five years
of the first leakage, although the remainder of a project might well extend beyond
a five-year period.” Id.
216. 328 Barry Ave., LLC v. Nolan Props. Grp., LLC, 871 N.W.2d 745, 752
(Minn. 2015). Nolan testified on behalf of 328 LLC that several other minor
defects, including weather seals on the doors, had been brought to the attention
of the subcontractors prior to the “punch list” phase of construction. Id. Each of
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These minor defects are rarely considered grave enough to resort
to litigation. If this were the standard, builders would not be
allowed any leeway to make minor mistakes along the way, which
would substantially harm the construction business. Further,
common-sense and regard for financial self-interest warrant the
assumption that owners would not pay subcontractors or
contractors if they felt that there was a serious pending defect that
needed to be corrected. Final payment generally signals the end of
a professional relationship, and the payment would not be
extended if the paying party felt that the services rendered were
217
not adequately performed.
Due to the inherent uncertainty of the extent and source of an
injury while there is still work to be performed, owners should have
reasonable certainty about these facts before bringing a lawsuit
218
against contractors. While the term “injury” in Minnesota Statutes
section 541.051 is somewhat open to interpretation, the policy
motivations driving the statute of limitations and the history of the
construction industry indicate that the legislature could not have
219
intended “injury” to mean “minor defect.” While the statute is
silent on the meaning of actionable injury, in the interests of
internal consistency and public policy, this meaning cannot be
adopted.
V. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding in 328 Barry that the
statute of limitations on construction-defect claims may begin to
run before construction is substantially complete is a consistent
reflection of the historic rationale behind the enactment of statutes

these issues, including the water intrusion injury, had been remedied to NPG’s
satisfaction during the final phase of construction, prior to the issuance of the
certificate of occupancy. Id.
217. Id. In explaining his reasonable belief that the initial water intrusion had
been a minor defect that had been corrected in full, Nolan noted that NPG and all
the subcontractors had been paid for their work. Id.
218. Hyland Hill N. Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Hyland Hill Co., 538 N.W.2d 479,
484 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (“It would be unsound public policy to impose a
stricter rule, requiring a party to investigate all possibilities at the first sign of a
problem.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 549 N.W.2d 617 (Minn. 1996).
219. In fact, the dictionary defines “injury” as a “violation of another’s rights
for which the law allows an action to recover damages.” Injury, MERRIAMWEBSTER.COM, supra note 188.
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220

of limitations in construction litigation. This strict interpretation
reflects legislative intent to shield construction companies from
221
However, while the court
exposure to unjustifiable liability.
correctly held that reasonable minds could differ as to what
222
constitutes discovery of injury, the court missed an opportunity to
clarify this standard. In the absence of statutory clarity, the court
should adopt a clear rule governing the meaning of discovery of
injury to trigger the statute of limitations. In the interests of
preserving legitimate claims, promoting judicial efficiency, and
minimizing wasteful expenditure of resources, the statute of
limitations should begin upon discovery of an injury sufficient for a
plaintiff to maintain a cause of action. This approach requires
further investigation between the time a defect is first discovered
and when the suit is filed to either verify the legitimacy of a claim
or abate a minor problem. Ultimately, this higher standard, which
requires plaintiffs to have proof of the injury sufficient to maintain
a cause of action, lends some certainty to both owners and builders
as to the limitation period and protects diligent owners against the
harshness of the traditional discovery rule.

220. Compare 328 Barry, 871 N.W.2d at 751, with infra Part II.
221. Kittson Cty. v. Wells, Denbrook & Assocs., 308 Minn. 237, 241, 241
N.W.2d 799, 802 (1976).
222. 328 Barry, 871 N.W.2d at 751.
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